London Bus Pedal Confusion Linked to Three Crashes a Month

Key Points

• Transport for London data recorded 40 bus collisions caused by pedal application error in 2025, equivalent to more than three incidents a month.
• The 2025 figure was down from 49 incidents in 2024, but remained the second-highest annual total since TfL began recording pedal-confusion incidents in 2019.
• Bus driver Joe, who runs the Better Buses YouTube channel, said distraction and the physical design of bus controls can contribute to pedal confusion.
• Joe told MyLondon that drivers may experience a rapid “fight or flight” reaction after pressing the wrong pedal, potentially causing them to press the accelerator harder.
• The issue has previously been linked to the fatal August 2021 Victoria Station collision in which 32-year-old Melissa Burr was killed.
• Joe said the mixture of diesel, hybrid and electric buses can create different acceleration and engine-feedback characteristics for drivers.
• He suggested alternatives including a hand-controlled accelerator and changes to the way buses respond when an accelerator is pressed with extreme force.
• TfL says pedal-error prevention forms part of its wider Vision Zero programme and that the second phase of its Bus Safety Standard includes measures designed to reduce the risk.
• TfL’s 2026 Bus Safety Standard 2 includes acceleration suppression technology intended to limit unintended acceleration when the accelerator is pressed forcefully.
• TfL also says it is improving incident data, including through the use of footwell CCTV cameras.

Britain Today News (BTN) October 3, 2026 – Transport for London data shows that pedal application error was recorded as the cause of 40 bus collisions across London during 2025, meaning the problem occurred at a rate of more than three incidents a month. Although the total was lower than the 49 incidents recorded in 2024, it was still the second-highest annual figure since TfL began formally recording pedal-confusion incidents in 2019. The figures have renewed attention on how drivers interact with accelerator and brake controls, particularly as London’s bus fleet contains diesel, hybrid and electric vehicles with different driving characteristics. TfL says the issue is being addressed through its wider road-safety programme and the second phase of its Bus Safety Standard.

How many London bus collisions were caused by pedal application error in 2025?

The TfL figures at the centre of the report show that 40 collisions in 2025 were attributed to pedal application error. That was a reduction of nine incidents compared with 2024, when 49 were recorded.

The 2025 total nevertheless remains significant because it represents the second-highest annual figure since TfL began collecting specific data on pedal confusion in 2019.

The figures do not mean that every incident resulted in serious injury or a fatality. They record collisions in which pedal application error was identified as the cause. The data therefore provides an indication of the frequency of the problem rather than a measure of the severity of every individual crash.

TfL’s work on the issue is not new. Its published bus-vehicle specifications have included dedicated requirements and assessment protocols for pedal application error. TfL documents show that the authority has developed testing and guidance around systems intended to address the problem.

Why can bus drivers confuse the accelerator and brake pedals?

According to the MyLondon report supplied for this story, bus driver Joe, who operates the Better Buses YouTube channel, believes driver distraction is an important factor in pedal confusion.

Joe told his followers that distraction can occur when drivers are dealing with operational pressures. He argued that attention can move away from the position of the driver’s feet, leaving a driver vulnerable to selecting the wrong pedal during an unexpected event.

The driver’s position inside a bus is also different from that of a conventional car. Drivers cannot simply look down at their feet while operating the vehicle, particularly when dealing with traffic, passengers and other road users.

Joe described his own experience of pressing the wrong pedal while driving a car about two decades ago. He said that he had removed his feet from the pedals while coasting when the vehicle ahead suddenly stopped.

According to his account to MyLondon, he looked towards the pedals and temporarily found himself unable to identify cognitively which pedal to use. He initially pressed the accelerator before recognising the mistake and moving to the brake.

He said the incident resulted only in a minor collision, but argued that other drivers may respond differently when confronted with a sudden emergency.

How can a driver’s reaction make pedal confusion more dangerous?

Joe’s explanation focuses on what can happen after the initial pedal error.

He told MyLondon that a driver experiencing an unexpected pedal error can enter what he described as a “fight or flight” response. In such circumstances, the driver may instinctively press down harder rather than immediately recognising that the accelerator, rather than the brake, is being applied.

For a large passenger bus, continued acceleration can quickly increase the severity of a collision.

The consequences can vary depending on the circumstances. A bus may collide with another vehicle, a building, a lamppost or parked cars. Where pedestrians are nearby, the consequences can be more serious.

The concern is particularly relevant because a bus driver has to manage a much larger and heavier vehicle than a private car, while also operating in environments where pedestrians, cyclists and other vehicles can be close to the bus.

What happened in the fatal Victoria Station collision?

Pedal confusion has previously been examined in connection with a fatal collision at Victoria bus station.

Melissa Burr, 32, was killed on August 10, 2021, when a bus collided with another bus at the Victoria terminus. The impact pushed the stationary bus into Burr.

The Evening Standard reported in December 2021 that TfL’s safety committee had been told that “alleged pedal confusion” was thought to have been a factor. Journalist Ross Lydall reported that the incident could lead to a review of pedal arrangements, particularly as London’s electric bus fleet expanded.

Further court reporting later provided additional details. The Independent’s Emily Pennink reported in 2023 that the prosecution alleged driver Olusofa Popoola continued applying the accelerator after striking the stationary bus. The court heard that the bus was travelling at about 8mph at the point of collision and reached a peak speed of approximately 10mph.

The case subsequently resulted in a conviction for causing death by careless driving, according to later reporting. The Independent’s court coverage should be distinguished from the earlier reporting about the suspected cause of the incident: the possibility of pedal confusion was discussed, but the legal proceedings concerned the driver’s driving and responsibility for the collision.

The London Assembly has also previously raised questions about pedal confusion. A 2024 written-answer document referred to TfL data showing 262 pedal-confusion incidents and 235 injuries between April 2010 and January 2022, while asking about the relationship between the issue and different bus power systems.

Why does Joe say diesel, hybrid and electric buses may make the issue more complicated?

The Better Buses driver also raised concerns about differences between London’s various bus technologies.

His argument, as reported by MyLondon, is that drivers can receive different forms of feedback depending on whether they are operating a diesel, hybrid or electric bus.

Joe said diesel engines provide audible feedback through engine revs, which can help a driver understand how the vehicle is responding to pedal input. Electric buses can also produce a different relationship between pedal pressure, motor response and vehicle movement.

He particularly highlighted hybrids because their combination of engine and electric motor operation can create a different sensory experience.

He told MyLondon that he had experienced hybrid buses apparently revving at traffic lights, which he said could create a mismatch between what a driver hears and what the driver feels from the vehicle.

Another issue is that drivers can be moved between different vehicle types. The report describes one driver who began a shift on an electric bus but was later instructed to switch to a diesel vehicle because newer buses were unavailable.

That means a driver may have to adjust to different acceleration characteristics during the same working day.

Could electric and hybrid buses accelerate differently from diesel buses?

The issue raised by Joe is not simply about engine noise.

Different propulsion systems can deliver different acceleration characteristics. Electric motors can provide substantial torque from standstill, while hybrid buses combine electric propulsion with an internal-combustion engine.

TfL’s own safety work recognises the need to account for unintended acceleration. Its Bus Safety Standard 2 specifically identifies acceleration suppression as a safety measure for pedal application error.

The published standard says the proposed system is designed to identify situations where an accelerator pedal is fully depressed with extreme force, as can happen when a driver mistakenly believes their foot is on the brake.

The system is intended to limit acceleration in those circumstances while avoiding interference with legitimate demands for power during normal driving. TfL says further research and testing are required to establish the precise activation criteria.

What changes has TfL introduced to tackle pedal application error?

TfL says pedal-error prevention forms part of its wider Bus Safety Standard and Vision Zero work.

In June 2026, TfL published the second phase of its Bus Safety Standard, setting out requirements for buses entering service through to 2033. The measures cover vehicle design, driver assistance, collision avoidance, passenger protection and driver-cab ergonomics.

One of the most directly relevant measures is acceleration suppression technology.

TfL says the technology will help prevent drivers accidentally pressing the accelerator too hard. The objective is to reduce both the likelihood and severity of collisions caused by unintended pedal application.

The Bus Safety Standard 2 roadmap gives acceleration suppression a required implementation date of 2030. The published technical document says the system is intended to activate when extreme force is applied to the accelerator, particularly where the circumstances indicate pedal application error.

TfL is also introducing measures addressing distraction and fatigue. Its June announcement said new buses will receive systems capable of providing visual, audio and touch alerts when fatigue or distraction is detected.

What other safety technology is included in Bus Safety Standard 2?

Pedal-error prevention is one element of a broader safety programme.

TfL’s second-generation standard includes a new Moving-Off Information System designed to prevent a bus moving off when a pedestrian or cyclist is immediately in front of it.

The standard also includes enhancements to Advanced Emergency Braking, extending protection to turning situations.

Driver-cab design is another area of development. TfL says it wants redesigned, ergonomic cabs that improve comfort, inclusivity and security while supporting safer driving.

TfL’s wider Vision Zero programme aims to eliminate deaths on or by a bus by 2030 and all deaths and serious injuries across London’s transport network by 2041. The authority reported that 10 people were killed in collisions involving a bus in London during 2025, the lowest number since 2021.

Has TfL previously built pedal-error systems into bus specifications?

Yes. TfL’s published vehicle specifications show that pedal application error has been incorporated into its technical requirements for several years.

A TfL bus specification from 2024 included a dedicated section covering pedal application error, as well as systems such as accelerator-light systems and brake toggling.

A later 2025 specification included a Pedal Application Error Assessment Protocol and guidance notes. The documentation also describes testing requirements for vehicles equipped with pedal-application-error systems.

This indicates that the current debate is taking place alongside an established technical programme rather than representing the first attempt by TfL to address the problem.

What alternative bus design does Joe propose?

Joe believes that changes to the physical arrangement of the controls could reduce the opportunity for pedal confusion.

One proposal he discussed is a hand-controlled accelerator, leaving only the brake pedal in the footwell.

His argument is based on the principle that safety systems can sometimes prevent human errors by changing the design of the control environment rather than relying entirely on drivers to avoid mistakes.

He compared the idea with historical aviation design changes involving controls that could be confused with one another. His example concerned US Air Force B-17 aircraft, where changes to the positioning and design of controls were used to reduce the possibility of pilots confusing flap and landing-gear controls.

Joe also suggested modifying how a bus reacts when an accelerator is pressed fully down.

Under his proposed approach, an extreme accelerator input could result in the vehicle slowing rather than delivering additional acceleration. This would be intended to address situations where a driver mistakenly presses the accelerator while believing the brake is being applied.

That proposal is different from the acceleration-suppression approach now being developed by TfL, although both seek to reduce the consequences of unintended accelerator application.

What does TfL say about the pedal-confusion problem?

TfL told the FOI requester that its work on pedal application error forms part of its broader Vision Zero action plans.

The authority said it is improving the quality of information available about pedal-error incidents involving London’s bus fleet. One measure mentioned by the FOI officer is the use of footwell CCTV cameras, which can provide additional evidence about what happened during an incident.

TfL’s current Bus Safety Standard also provides evidence that the authority is moving towards technical intervention rather than relying solely on driver behaviour. The 2026 standard specifically includes acceleration suppression, while wider requirements address distraction, emergency braking and cab design.

What is the wider background to London’s pedal-confusion issue?

Pedal application error has been an identified safety issue within London’s bus system for years.

TfL’s technical documents show that the authority has developed dedicated assessment protocols and vehicle requirements for the problem. The issue has also been raised through London Assembly questions and safety discussions following serious incidents.

The 2021 death of Melissa Burr brought particular public attention to the issue. The subsequent reporting and court proceedings demonstrated the distinction between a suspected pedal mistake and the legal assessment of a driver’s conduct.

The development of Bus Safety Standard 2 represents the latest stage of TfL’s response. Its requirements extend beyond pedal confusion to a broader range of vehicle, driver and passenger safety risks.

TfL said in June 2026 that its first Bus Safety Standard had already influenced safety requirements beyond London and that casualty numbers on routes covered by the standard had fallen by approximately 41 per cent over the period analysed, compared with about 22 per cent on control routes.

What could the pedal-confusion figures mean for London bus passengers and road users?

For London passengers, pedestrians, cyclists and other road users, the immediate significance of the figures is that pedal application error remains a recorded source of bus collisions despite the number falling from 49 in 2024 to 40 in 2025.

The available evidence does not establish that every incident has the same cause, severity or outcome. It also does not demonstrate that one particular vehicle technology is responsible for the overall total.

What is clear from TfL’s technical programme is that the authority is seeking to reduce the consequences of unintended accelerator application through vehicle technology, driver-support systems and improved data collection.

The next stage will depend partly on how the new systems perform in operational conditions. TfL’s own technical material states that further research and testing are required before the activation criteria for acceleration suppression are finalised.

Background: How has London’s bus safety strategy developed?

TfL introduced its Bus Safety Standard in 2018, with successive requirements introduced for buses entering service. The programme has covered areas including intelligent speed assistance, emergency braking, improved visibility, collision protection and systems designed to assist drivers.

The second phase, announced in June 2026, extends that approach through requirements for buses entering service in 2027, 2030 and 2033. It places additional emphasis on driver assistance, fatigue and distraction, vehicle design and unintended acceleration.

TfL’s broader Vision Zero strategy sets the target of no one being killed on or by a bus by 2030, followed by the elimination of deaths and serious injuries across London’s transport network by 2041.

Prediction: How could this development affect London bus passengers and road users?

The available evidence suggests that the principal effect for London bus passengers and other road users is likely to come through changes to new-bus design and driver-assistance technology rather than an immediate change to every vehicle already operating.

TfL’s planned acceleration-suppression technology is specifically intended to reduce unintended acceleration caused by extreme pedal application, while distraction alerts and redesigned driver cabs are intended to address wider aspects of driver interaction with the vehicle.

However, the timetable means that some measures will take time to enter the fleet. The Bus Safety Standard 2 roadmap identifies 2030 for the acceleration-suppression requirement, while other measures apply at different stages. Consequently, the 40 pedal-application-error collisions recorded in 2025 remain an important baseline against which future safety data can be assessed.